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Introduction
China is currently experiencing a period of overproduction in real es-tate, which especially affects medium-sized cities, otherwise knownas third and fourth-tier cities, (1) the population of which is between
half a million and two million. (2) Since autumn 2014, the central govern-
ment has been encouraging property purchases, and various restrictions put
in place from 2010 onward have been gradually lifted. (3) Although these
measures were put in place as a result of (unacceptably) high housing prices,
mainly in big cities between 2008 and 2010, the current incentives are
aimed at avoiding a price drop in real estate, which would be even worse.
State monetary policy and regulations within the real estate market refer
more generally to the financial mechanisms at the heart of the urban
growth strategy in China. For many scholars, land has been a financial tool
that has driven the country’s urbanisation and economic growth since the
end of the 1990s. (4) At the centre of a decentralised system that allows
local governments (5) to plan urban development by transforming rural land
into urban land, revenues linked to land-use rights commodification have
been the basis for the Chinese “land-driven growth model,” brought about
by entrepreneurial local governments. (6) Contrary to this, other scholars
have shown that the decentralised system for urban development in China
has gone hand-in-hand with the huge cost of urbanisation borne by local
authorities. (7) According to national budgetary laws, local governments may
not get directly into debt, and have been encouraged to finance their in-
frastructures indirectly via local financial platforms, (8) especially since the
economic stimulus plan from 2008 to 2009. The result was an explosion in
local debt, which pushed the state to intervene from 2015 onward and re-
structure the debts by allowing urban governments to issue bonds in order
to finance their infrastructure.
These two areas of literature provide us with information on the financial
mechanisms that form the basis of Chinese urban development. However,
the sale of land-use rights is only a part of the accumulation of capital in
cities and of the creation of urban value. A “virtuous” urban capital accu-
mulation in China has only been possible due to the production and sale of
residential and commercial properties through the real estate industry.
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1. This urban hierarchy is both demographic and economic (Jones Lang Lasalle, China 60, from fast
growth to smart growth, Cities Research Center, Jones Lang Lasalle, 2015, http://www.jll.com/
china60/en-gb). Big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chongqing are considered
first-tier cities, whereas provincial capital cities belong to the second and third tier. Fourth-tier
cities are those that act as administrative centres for counties or districts. See also footnote 5.
2. Fulong Wu, “Commodification and housing market cycles in Chinese cities,” International Journal
of Housing Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2015, pp. 6-26.
3. It’s worth also mentioning the increase in capital stock and interest rates for mortgage loans
(from 20% to 30% and from 4.42% to 7.43% respectively from the end of 2009 to the beginning
of 2012), as well as measures put in place to prohibit the acquisition of bank loans in order to
buy a third flat, and in certain cases to prohibit non-residents buying housing, in more than 47
cities in China.
4. Georges C. S. Lin, “China’s landed urbanization: Neoliberalizing politics, land commodification,
and municipal finance in the growth of metropolises,” Environment and Planning A, Vol. 46, No.
8, 2014, pp. 1814-1835; Fulong Wu, op. cit.; Fulong Wu, Planning for Growth: Urban and Regional
Planning in China, Routledge, New York and London, 2015.
5. In China, the term local urban government, and consequently the notion of a city, refers to
an administrative hierarchy divided into four categories by the central government. In 2010,
China was made up of more than 27,000 municipal governments. In the first administration
category, four cities held the status of provincial city or municipality (Beijing, Shanghai, Tian-
jin, and Chongqing). In the second category, there were 283 prefectural cities, and the third
category was made up of 370 county-wide towns and 853 district-wide towns. The final cat-
egory was made up of 26,333 smaller towns under the jurisdiction of county-wide towns
(Christine P. Wong, “Paying for urbanization in China: Challenges of municipal finance in the
21st century,” in Roy W. Bahl, Johannes F. Linn, and Deborah L. Wetzel, Financing Metropolitan
Governments in Developing Countries, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2013, pp. 273-308).
However, municipal territories, independently of their administrative category, are made up
of a central city and the land around it, both suburban and rural (villages and farmland),
which makes it difficult to really distinguish between urban and rural land. Demographically
speaking, even though the distinction between urban and rural populations is based on hukou
(the household registration system), calculating the urban population remains problematic
(see Yves Boquet, “Le taux d’urbanisation de la Chine” [The rate of urbanisation in China], Es-
pace, Populations, Sociétés, Vol. 3, 2009, pp. 355-357). Throughout the rest of this article, the
term municipal or urban government is used to refer to local government, which is indepen-
dent of the administrative hierarchy.
6. Shenjing He and Fulong Wu, “China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism: Perspectives from urban re-
development,” Antipode, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2009, pp. 282–304.
7. Kai Y. Tsui, “China’s infrastructure investment boom and local debt crisis,” Eurasian Geography and
Economics, Vol. 52, No. 5, 2011, pp. 686-711; Christine P. Wong, “Paying for urbanization in China:
Challenges of municipal finance in the 21st century,” in Roy W. Bahl, Johannes F. Linn, and Deborah
L. Wetzel, Financing Metropolitan Governments in Developing Countries, op. cit., pp. 273-308.
8. Kai Y. Tsui, “China’s infrastructure investment boom and local debt crisis,” op. cit.; Pan Fenghua,
Zhang Fengmei, Zhu Shengjun, and Wojcik Dariusz, “Developing by borrowing? Interjurisdictional
competition, land finance and local debt accumulation in China,” Urban Studies, 2016.
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A Case Study of Qujing, a Medium-Sized City in Yunnan Province
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ABSTRACT: Illustrated by a case study on the urban development of a medium-sized city in China, this article develops a theoretical framework
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been used in order to link the various mechanisms between land, urban infrastructure, property development, and financing channels in
urban production. The case study illustrates the many interactions between local government and real estate businesses, both state and pri-
vate, as well as local banks, in order to create urban infrastructure that responds to “communal and public” needs and real estate objectives
of a “private and individual” nature. In doing so, it highlights the fundamental role of capital in urban production in China.
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However, until now, the ways in which local property markets work in rela-
tion to demand and, very importantly, their financing, have not been well-
documented within the field of urban geography, or more widely in urban
studies. (9) In bringing together three fields of literature, this article develops,
in its first part, an interpretive and theoretical framework for the financing
of urban development in China and subsequently suggests a continuum of
the interrelations between land, urban infrastructure, property development,
and the financial system. This framework is illustrated in the second part
by a case study carried out in the city of Qujing in Yunnan Province. Qujing
is representative of the land-based urban growth model of several hundred
medium-sized Chinese cities, which are today affected by overproduction
in the property market. 
Land-based financing for urban development
in China
This section develops an interpretative and theoretical framework for
land-based financing of the urban growth model (see Figure 1). In order to
understand that the accumulation of capital in a Chinese city is based on
the continued increase in land and property prices, one must look in detail
at the role of the financial system in the links between land and the pro-
duction of urban infrastructures and property. The proposed hypothesis for
the accumulation of capital in a Chinese city is very simple: it works on the
assumption – within the setting of an institutional and economic system
that will be laid out in this section – that the first stage of urban develop-
ment is based on debt. This serves to finance infrastructure, most notably
basic infrastructure (water, electricity, roads, etc.), which is fundamental to
the value of land that is then conceded to property development companies
to build the city at a second stage. In this way, the sale of land-use rights
brings essential fiscal revenue to local governments, which is the basis for
the model of urban development in China. However, the continued accu-
mulation of capital in the city is predicated on property developers man-
aging to sell their buildings to individuals (residential) and businesses
(commercial). (10) It also assumes that the property developers have been
able to finance the property development projects. The role of the financial
system is consequently very important. All of this seems to be obvious.
However, it is necessary to bring together three different fields of literature
in order to obtain a global view of the financial channels at play in the urban
development model in China. Although the first two fields rely on land as a
source of both revenue and debt, the third field brings into play the way
property markets work, without, however, taking into account the financing
channels for real estate development projects.
Land as revenue for real estate projects
For the vast majority of authors on urban geography, the growth of Chinese
cities since the end of the 90s is based on land. The urban development
model in China falls within the framework of the decentralisation of powers
in terms of land management, urban planning, and taxation based principally
on land revenue. Firstly, following the various land and property reforms car-
ried out since the end of the 1990s, (11) land rights in China are based on a
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9. Thierry Theurillat, “The role of money in China’s urban production: The local property industry in
Qujing, a fourth-tier city,” Urban Geography, 2016; Natacha Aveline-Dubach, “Centralité du foncier
et dynamiques immobilières en Chine, une approche par le Developmental State” (Centrality of
land and real estate dynamics in China through the prism of the Developmental State), Conference
paper: International Conference Research & Regulation 2015, Paris, https://theorie-
regulation.org/colloques/colloque-rr-2015/programme-rr2015/ (accessed 13 December 2016).
10. Fulong Wu, “Commodification and housing market cycles in Chinese cities,” op. cit.
11. The different reforms refer to the 1988 amendment of the Constitution, which permits the transfer
of land-use rights, to the Land Law of 1998, which stipulates that the sale of land-use rights is
under the jurisdiction of local governments, and to the 1998 Property Law, which is based on the
transformation of the public residence allocation system to a system of marketisation.
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Figure 1 – Conceptual framework for the relationship between land, urban infrastructure, property, 






















dual system of land ownership and the allocation of use rights. (12) Only urban
land can be allocated by local governments. Firstly, the local governments
who own the urban land as representatives of the state allocate land-use
rights, for a set amount of time, for real estate development projects relating
to all sectors. (13) Secondly, local governments are able to transform rural land
belonging to village collectives into urban land that is then integrated into
the urban master plan and the land market, in accordance with the law on
urban planning of 1989. The reforms established the coexistence of tradi-
tional methods for administrative, and therefore free, allocation of land for
public projects (typically for public infrastructure, schools, and hospitals, but
also for zones for economic development) and a system for the sale of land-
use rights according to market principles for private construction projects.
Since 2002, the Land Law has reinforced the market mechanism of auction-
ing land-use rights, and prohibits transactions by joint agreement based on
private negotiations. Within the framework of the financial system estab-
lished since 1994, revenue from the allocation of land for property develop-
ment projects is at the discretion of the local government. It is considered
“extra-budgetary,” and should not be shared with the central government
or the province. With the rise in real estate prices during the decade starting
in 2000, it rapidly became a primary fiscal resource for Chinese cities, (14) in-
cluding very large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. (15)
Land as financial leverage has been the driving force behind the accumu-
lation of capital and decentralised urban development in China. Since the
mid-90s, municipal governments have in fact been playing an accumulated
strategic role in terms of economic growth through urban development.
Some scholars have therefore discussed the role of local governments as
developers, (16) or local governments as entrepreneurs, (17) which reflects eco-
nomic coalitions between local governments and the property development
industry. In order to meet national demands for an increase in GDP and in-
vestment in fixed assets, which are the essential criteria for evaluation and
promotion of local governors, (18) local governments have planned and cre-
ated their cities in accordance with objectives for economic growth. (19) The
urban economic model based on land relies on the continued increase in
land and property prices brought about by two main mechanisms. The first
refers to a land strategy based on the attraction of domestic and foreign
investments brought about by a driving force that assumes firstly the sale
of industrial land at a good price, or for free, in order to then sell plots that,
in the meantime, will have increased in value following industrial develop-
ment for residential and commercial property development projects. (20)
However, starting in the mid-2000s, “zone fever” (21) surrounding land un-
dergoing economic development was short-circuited. Urban development
was increasingly relying on development megaprojects, vast new urban
neighbourhoods, or entire new towns. (22) The second mechanism used as
part of the land-based development strategy is linked to “land grabbing,” (23)
meaning the facilitated integration of rural areas close to urban areas in
order to increase land reserves and benefit from the differential land values,
to the detriment of village collectives. To sum up, the land-based urban
growth model has created intercity competition to attract investors on the
one hand, (24) and an extensive urbanisation process that is swallowing up
farmland on the other hand. (25)
Land as a form of debt to build urban infrastructures
A certain number of scholars have highlighted the costs of urban devel-
opment in China and the structural imbalances in the fiscal system that
was introduced in 1994. (26) Local governments must take responsibility for
more than 80% of the spending on urban and social infrastructure (trans-
port network construction, water and electricity supplies, and the provision
of hospitals and schools) using less than 50% of their budgetary revenue
and without using central government funds. (27) Since the extra-budgetary
revenue from the sale of land-use rights is not enough, land was also used
as collateral to raise funds. According to national budgetary laws, they can-
not go into debt directly, so urban administrations have used “local financing
platforms” (LFPs), either investment companies (touzi gongsi) or local busi-
nesses (construction businesses or urban infrastructure service providers:
chengtou gongsi), which have used the land granted to them by the local
authorities as collateral to obtain bank loans. (28) This indirect state debt sys-
tem established at the beginning of the 90s, which brought about a huge
financial crisis at the end of that decade, was gradually reactivated in the
second half of the 2000s, and particularly since the massive economic stim-
ulus plan of 2008-2009. Because urban infrastructure is the principal lever-
age for investments (72% of the four trillion RMB total injected into the
economy), (29) local governments used LFPs more and more. They obtained
bank loans and, increasingly, capital from finance companies and investment
funds, or issued corporate bonds via the interbank lending market. Within a
few years, the debt-based urban development system snowballed, and local
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12. Georges C.S. Lin and Samuel P. S. Ho, “The state, land system, and land development processes in
contemporary China,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 95, No. 2, 2005,
pp. 411–436.
13. Land-use rights are valid for a limited period of time: 70 years for residential land, 50 years for in-
dustrial land, and 40 years for commercial land.
14. Mylène Gaulard, “Changes in the Chinese property market: An indicator of the difficulties faced
by local authorities,” China Perspectives, Vol. 2, 2013, pp. 3-14.
15. Georges C.S. Lin, “China’s landed urbanization: Neoliberalizing politics, land commodification, and
municipal finance in the growth of metropolises,” op. cit.
16. Jieming Zhu, “Local growth coalition: The context and implications of China’s gradualist urban
land reforms,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1999, pp. 534-
548.
17. Shenjing He and Fulong Wu, “China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism: Perspectives from urban re-
development,” op. cit.
18. Shiuh-Shen Chien, “New local state power through administrative restructuring – a case study of
post-Mao China county-level urban entrepreneurialism in Kunshan,” Geoforum, Vol. 46, No. 1,
2013, pp. 103-112.
19. Fulong Wu, Planning for Growth: Urban and Regional Planning in China, op. cit.
20. Ibid.
21. Carolyn Cartier, “‘Zone fever’, the arable land debate, and real estate speculation: China’s evolving
land-use regime and its geographical contradictions,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No.
28, 2001, pp. 445-469.
22. You-Tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2010.
23. Georges C.S. Lin, Developing China: Land, Politics and Social Conditions, London, Routledge, 2009.
24. Shenjing He and Fulong Wu, “China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism: Perspectives from urban re-
development,” op. cit.
25. You-Tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China, op. cit.,
2010; Shiuh-Shen Chien, “Local Farmland Loss and Preservation in China – A Perspective of Quota
Territorialization,” Land-use Policy, Vol. 49, 2015, pp. 65-74.
26. Richard M. Bird, “Getting it right: Financing urban development in China,” Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin,
March-April, 2005, pp. 107-117; Sylvie Démurger, “Infrastructure development and economic
growth: An explanation for regional disparities in China?”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.
29, 2001, pp. 95–117; Weiping Wu, “Urban infrastructure financing and economic performance in
China,” Urban Geography, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2010, pp. 648-667.
27. Lin Ye and Alfred M. Wu, “Urbanization, land development and land financing: Evidence from Chi-
nese cities,” Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1-15.
28. Kai Y. Tsui, “China’s infrastructure investment boom and local debt crisis,” op. cit.
29. Sara Hsu and Jianjun Li, “The rise and fall of shadow banking in China,” Working papers, No. 375,
Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2014, http://doc-
player.net/1395045-The-rise-and-fall-of-shadow-banking-in-china-sara-hsu-and-jianjun-li-febru-
ary-2015-workingpaper-series-number-375.html (accessed 12 December 2016).
Thierry Theurillat – Financing Urban Growth in China
debt, which was at 5.57 trillion RMB in 2008, more than doubled, (30) forcing
the central government to intervene. Since 2015, a section of the local debt
has been restructured and local governments have been able to sell bonds
more directly. Recovering local debt is fundamentally linked to selling land,
since the revenue that comes from exploiting infrastructure represents only
a small proportion of local government resources. (31) Consequently, we can
understand the importance of the increase in land prices.
To sum up, the two fields of literature focused on land highlight the fi-
nancial mechanisms within the framework of a Chinese urban political
economy. On the one hand, land is a strong leverage resource for urbanisa-
tion, since it provides large fiscal revenues for local governments. But on
the other hand, urbanisation comes at a significant cost and goes hand-in-
hand with investments in urban infrastructure, which necessarily increase
local debt levels. If one simultaneously sees land as both a form of debt and
a form of revenue, then accumulation of capital can only be understood if
one thinks about what happens after the land is sold. Property markets are
indeed involved in the accumulation of capital and urban growth created
by the land market in China. (32)
The role of the property development industry
One widespread type of literature that discusses property markets has fo-
cused on the relationship between the increase in land and property prices
and property demand according to an individual’s revenue, savings rate, or
the effects of monetary policies on real estate businesses. (33) It focuses on
the reality and importance of the Chinese housing bubble. (34) However,
these discussions have neglected the context of the political economy, in
which changes in price and in the dynamics of property markets take
place. (35) A certain number of scholars have illustrated the role played by
the property development sector in Chinese economic growth since the
(neo)liberal reforms at the end of the 90s, showing the transformation of a
public system into a system of marketisation in terms of housing alloca-
tions. (36) Encouraging property ownership may have stimulated the property
development industry, but it wasn’t until 2003-2004 that companies orig-
inally belonging to the state were generally able to adapt to the demand
and make a profit. State-owned companies therefore transformed from
housing producers and distributors into property developers and even prop-
erty speculators. (37) State-owned companies also took advantage of the
2008-2009 economic stimulus plan, since the banks provided them with
capital. This cash injection also had an effect on the land prices in big cities,
since these companies spent vast sums to acquire land. (38) In addition, land-
use values linked to property ownership and the property development mar-
ket were also stimulated by investment demands. (39) The increase in
property prices linked to urban development has contributed to the fact
that real estate has become the ultimate form of investment and return for
urban households. Real estate is the “rational” alternative when comparing
it to bank accounts with a low return, because interest rates are kept below
the rate of inflation, or investments in financial markets that are not yet
well developed. (40) Multi-property ownership and property speculation,
which can be rewarding in the long term, particularly as a way of compen-
sating for the lack of social security (pensions), became essential factors in
price increases in the property market of Chinese cities during the 2000s. (41)
However, in the same way that urban geography literature is based on the
links between land and capital only in terms of public finances, very little
work has been done on the role of the financial system for the real estate
sector in China. (42) On a national scale, the banking system is still of utmost
importance, but is not enough, particularly for small and medium-sized
businesses. (43) Other non-banking sectors that fall into the category of
“shadow-banking,” such as secure loan companies (e.g. pawnbrokers) and
other microloan businesses, play a role in financing the Chinese economy. (44)
The case of the City of Qujing: The role of
capital in urban development
This section illustrates the interdependencies between urban infrastruc-
ture, property development projects, and finance channels in the case of
the urban development of a medium-sized Chinese city, Qujing, Yunnan
Province. The study specifically concerns the inner, central perimeter (Qujing
Qilin shi zhongxin 曲靖麒麟市中心) of the urban district (Qujing Qilin qu
曲靖麒麟区) of Qujing Prefecture (Qujing shi 曲靖市). (45) The study is based
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30. In a few years, the number of Local Financing Platforms (LFPs) and the total sum of local debt
skyrocketed. At the end of June 2013, there were more than 10,000 LFPs and the total debt of
local governments was estimated at 17.88 trillion RMB, which officially represented around 33%
of the national GDP. National Audit Office (NAO), Quanguo zhengfuxing zhaiwu shenji jieguo
(Results of the audit on national government debt), 2013, http://www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/
n1992150/n1992379/n3432165.files/n3432112.pdf (accessed 13 December 2016).
31. World Bank and the Development Research Center of China’s State Council, Urban China: Towards
Efficient, Inclusive and Sustainable Urbanization, Washington DC, World Bank, 2014,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/publication/urban-china-toward-efficient-inclusive-
sustainable-urbanization (accessed 13 December 2016).
32. Fulong Wu, “Commodification and housing market cycles in Chinese cities,” op. cit.
33. Xiaoqing E. Xu and Tao Chen, “The effect of monetary policy on real estate price growth in China,”
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2012, pp. 62-77; Yongheng Deng, Joe Gyourko, and
Jing Wu, “Land and house price measurement in China,” National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper, No. 18403, 2012, http://www.nber.org/papers/w18403 (accessed 12th December
2016); Xin Wang and Yi Wen, “Housing prices and the high Chinese saving rate puzzle,” China Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2012, pp. 265-283.
34. Natacha Aveline-Dubach, “Les dynamiques différenciées de la “bulle immobilière” chinoise (The
various dynamics of the Chinese housing bubble),” Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography,
2016, https://cybergeo.revues.org/27654 (accessed 12th December 2016); Christian Dreger and
Yanqun Zhang, “Is there a bubble in the Chinese housing market?”, Urban Policy and Research,
Vol. 31, No. 1, 2013, pp. 27-39; Mylène Gaulard, “Changes in the Chinese property market: an in-
dicator of the difficulties faced by local authorities,” op. cit.
35. Fulong Wu, “Commodification and housing market cycles in Chinese cities,” op. cit.
36. Hung-Gay Fung, Jau-Lian Jeng, and Qingfeng Liu, “Development of China’s real estate market,”
The Chinese Economy, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2010, pp. 71-92; Alfred Junjian Cao, The Chinese real estate
market: Development, regulation & investment, London & New York, Routledge, 2015.
37. Miao Zhang and Rajah Rasiah, “Institutional change and state-owned enterprises in China’s urban
housing market,” Habitat International, Vol. 41, 2014, pp. 58-68.
38. Yongheng Deng, Randall Morck, Jing Wu, and Bernard Yeung, “China’s pseudo-monetary policy,”
Review of Finance, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 55-93.
39. Richard Hu, “Drivers of China’s urbanisation and property development,” Australasian Journal of
Regional Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2013, pp. 156-179.
40. Edward N. Coulson and Mingzhe Tang, “Institutional and demographic influences on the presence,
scale and geographic scope of individual Chinese real estate investment,” Regional Science and
Urban Economics, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2013, pp. 187-196.
41. Natacha Aveline-Dubach, “Centralité du foncier et dynamiques immobilières en Chine, une ap-
proche par le Developmental State (Centrality of land and real estate dynamics in China through
the prism of the Developmental State),” op. cit.
42. Thierry Theurillat, “The role of money in China’s urban production: The local property industry in
Qujing, a fourth-tier city,” op. cit.; Natacha Aveline-Dubach, ibid.
43. Min Liu, Financing alternatives for small real estate developers in China: A case study of
Guangzhou, Master’s thesis, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, 2011, http://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:491656/FULLTEXT01.pdf (accessed 12 December 2016).
44. Franklin Allen, F., Jun Qian, Chenying Zhang, and Mengxin Zhao, “China’s financial system: Oppor-
tunities and challenges,” NBER Working paper, No. 17828, 2012, http://www19.iadb.org/intal/in-
talcdi/PE/2012/09844.pdf (accessed 12 December 2016).
45. In 2013, the population of the urban district of Qujing, Qilin, was 758,000 inhabitants over an
area of 1,445 km2. The population of the urban administration zone was 6.32 million in 2011
over an area of 28,904 km2. For simplicity’s sake, the terms municipal government, urban gov-
ernment, or City of Qujing are used when referring to the government of the urban district of
Qujing Qilin.
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on a deep understanding of the area (a period of residency from September
2011 to June 2014 and multiple trips there between 2001 and 2009), 20
semi-structured interviews with key players (six main urban developers; six
other developers, either external or much smaller in size; three city services
supervisors from the department for tax and town planning; two bankers,
one from the commercial bank of the City of Qujing and one from the Chi-
nese Construction Bank; three real estate salesmen and advisors), and anal-
ysis of various documents, internet sites, and data on the market and local
businesses (Qujing’s real estate magazine; brochures on property develop-
ment projects; statistics from Qujing’s urban district and from a local prop-
erty consultancy, Lisking). 
The City of Qujing’s masterplan as the driving force
behind urban development
The current masterplan, established in 2005, planning the needs of an
urban conglomeration of one million inhabitants between now and 2020,
was at the source of the increase in real estate values and the stimulation
of the local property market. The different uses of urban land, based on dif-
ferentiation between residential and non-residential zones (industrial areas
and commercial areas) and mixed zones and urban functions have been
completely reorganised. The central urban area of the urban district of Qu-
jing (Qujing Qilin shi zhongxin 曲靖麒麟市中心) has been divided into four
new zones around the city centre (see Map 1). The gradual increase of the
city centre area has been seen as a mean to reinforce the economic and
demographic status of Qujing as the second city in Yunnan, after the provin-
cial capital, Kunming. The urbanised area of Qujing increased from 27.4km2
in 2005, to 67.9km2 in 2013, the aim being to reach 100km2 between now
and 2020. The huge increase in property reserves has gone hand-in-hand
with a huge increase in population, since the villages and neighbouring
towns have become part of Qujing’s demographic.
In order to put the urban extension and the urban development outlined
in the masterplan into action, the City of Qujing relied on a small number
of local property companies, and in particular on its state-owned businesses.
Although the new motorway linking Kunming to Guizhou Province and the
new Kunming-Shanghai high-speed train line were financed through inter-
governmental funds, the other substantial infrastructure and property in-
vestments were financed via various mechanisms of negotiation and
public/private partnership contracts between the local government, prop-
erty development companies, both private and state-owned, (46) and the
local banks. The development of the four new urban zones and the creation
of the centre of each of these were completed in stages.
The creation of new urban centres and the property
development projects that triggered this
The construction of new multifunctional urban centres from 2010, which
combined both residential and commercial functions (see Map 1), must be
considered as part of the framework of the very first property development
projects and original investments. These investments triggered the first stage
of urban value creation in the new urban zones.
The two municipal property development companies, Dongsheng and
Qilin, and the two investment companies (touzi gongsi 投资公司) specifi-
cally created in 2009 by the City of Qujing, were the driving force behind
the development of the northern and southern zones. As part of the devel-
opment model, these companies were granted land. This land was used as
collateral to raise funds, the reimbursement of which is based, for the in-
vestment companies, on revenue linked to the sale of land-use rights, which
(in theory) increase in value as urban development continues. For the prop-
erty development companies, this is based on the sale of development pro-
jects.
The state-owned property development company Dongsheng was the
original operator behind the development of the new northern urban zone.
Dongsheng was granted 100m of land on either side of eight kilometres of
road that it had built in 2003. This road therefore quickly became the central
link for urban development between Qujing’s city centre and the satellite
town of Zhanyi to the north. Since then, Dongsheng has built seven resi-
dential areas on old farmland, and more recently three mixed-purpose areas
that are both residential and commercial (see Table 1). As the northern
urban zone developed, Dongsheng took advantage of the increase in land
prices by selling off different parcels to local and external developers. In
2013, the first multifunctional project (Wenzhou Guoji), in the northern
zone, was built by a private property development company (Xian Zhong
Cheng) from Wenzhou (Zhejiang Province). It combined housing, a shopping
centre (for wholesale trade), and leisure activities (a hotel, restaurants, and
cinema), and was backed by the Qujing and Zhanyi local governments. The
project progressed quickly, as 70% of 1,100 apartments and 90% of the
commercial properties were sold in the first year. Because it also managed
five similar shopping centres in other provinces (Anhui, Henan, and Zhe-
jiang), the developer was able to convince a large majority of its commercial
partners of the market potential of Qujing. It’s thanks to large state invest-
ments that the project became the central commercial area in the northern
zone. Firstly, it’s located close to the motorway that links Kunming to the
neighbouring province of Guangxi, and which was completed in 2007. Sec-
ondly, it benefited from the development of residential property throughout
the northern zone, which was stimulated because of having a central area
of public interest. Eight vocational schools, bringing together more than
60,000 students, a new administration centre for municipal and regional
services, as well as cultural facilities, a sports centre with a stadium (20,000
seats), and four museums were built between 2008 and 2014. The first in-
vestment company to be created by the City of Qujing was behind the ma-
jority of the financing. The company raised funds by selling bonds (known
as municipal corporate bonds) on the interbank lending market and also re-
ceived loans from national trust companies. In the last few years, the City
of Qujing has used three companies, one in Yunnan (Yunnan Xintou Gongsi),
which has its headquarters in Kunming, and two others located in Beijing.
The state-owned property development company Qilin and the second
investment company were the operators responsible for the creation of
the new urban zone to the South. Qilin started by building two residential
zones on a large area of farmland (100ha) located at the edge of the city,
which was granted by the Qujing local government. Then, from 2010, the
masterplan moved towards constructing an urban centre (Qilin Jiacheng)
composed of a commercial and leisure centre (cinema, karaoke, and
restaurants), office blocks, hotels, and another two residential zones
around a huge central public space (133,333m2). The presence of Wal-
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46. The distinction between private and government businesses in China is blurred. The two municipal
property developers and the two investment companies mentioned are officially privately owned,
even though they were established by the City of Qujing. The other four main property developers
in Qujing are officially privately owned, but two of them belong to corporate groups that are
closely linked to the state (see Table 1).
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Mart, as well as other commercial chains on a national scale such as KFC,
GOME (electronics), and IMAX, attracted other operators. By the summer
of 2014, Qilin had sold 90% of its 1,800 apartments and four hotels to
specialist chains. Large parallel state investments made possible the on-
going relative success of this construction project, which has become the
central area of the southern part of the city. These investments have been
directed by the investment company created by the City of Qujing for
the southern zone. Its main aim was to ensure financing for site prepa-
ration for a large part of the whole southern zone (water, roads, electric-
ity). These investments were essential, at a secondary stage, in creating
value and selling the land-use rights for various development projects.
The southern part of the city, which has been built around a southerly
motorway link, was built within a few years and contains 58 residential
areas and 32 state-owned buildings (local government services as well
as services relating to the prefecture of Qujing and Yunnan Province;
courthouses).
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Map 1 – The five main urban zones in Qujing and the large property development projects
LARGE MULTIFUNCTIONAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Completed or ongoing since 2010
1. Xian Zhong Cheng property developers: Wenzhou Guoji – 2 billion RMB
2. Ansha property developers: Wanhe Guoji – 1.1 billion RMB
3. Xiongye property developers: Jindu Guoji – 2.5 billion RMB
4. Feilong property developers: Jiangjun Zhen – 1.6 billion RMB
5. Qilin property developers: Qilin Jiacheng – 5 billion RMB
6. Wanda property developers: Qujing Wanda Plaza – 1 billion RMB
HIGH-END AREAS (VILLAS)
Completed or ongoing since 2010
A. Evergrande property developers: Henda Mindu
B. Minda property developers: Jin Lin Wan












































The methods for developing the western and eastern zones were different,
since for these the City of Qujing did not rely directly on its four state-
owned companies. The original investments for the western urban zone
were made in 2002, in parallel with the construction of two universities (a
teachers’ college and a school of medicine) on farmland located 8km from
the city centre. The structure of this new urban area was based on the cre-
ation of a new area for economic development (guojia jingji kaifa qu 国家
经济开发区), which is still expanding, based around the two original chem-
ical plants. Meanwhile, around ten residential areas were built on farmland
increasingly distant from the city centre. The urban development project
currently underway, which is being led by a major national, or even inter-
national, developer, Wanda, is considered to be the development project
that will give the western zone a centre of its own. Wanda will build “Wanda
Plaza,” the one billion RMB investment that will combine a shopping and
leisure centre (cinema and restaurants) with hotel and offices as well as
residential properties.
In terms of the first stages of development for the eastern zone, which is
the last to have been integrated into the town planning, the Qujing gov-
ernment joined in partnership with the property developer Feilong. Feilong,
which is part of a corporate group of the same name (electronics and in-
dustrial machinery), moved forward with the construction of Qujing’s first
tourist development project, called Jiangjun Zhen (see Map 1). This project
is centred around the local culture, cuan, and is multifunctional. Feilong
started off with the construction of an area of 48 villas and the tourist zone
itself, which is made up of commercial and leisure stores (boutiques, restau-
rants, karaoke bar) inside a reconstructed palace in which the first imperial
general to settle in Qujing is supposed to have lived 700 years ago. The com-
pany continued the development by building an area for hotels and leisure
(tea houses and high-end restaurants). Financing the site preparation of this
farmland (363,000m2), partly occupied by a village, and the relocation of
its inhabitants to a new neighbourhood, were part of the overall costs of
the project that was financed by Feilong. Meanwhile, another development
project for tourists got off the ground, and is still underway, on 100 hectares
of neighbouring land bought by a property developer from Hong Kong.
These two big tourist development projects are seen as leverage for the
tourism-based development of the eastern urban zone, a prioritised sector
within the province’s five-year plan (2011-2015).
The division of the local property market and
favourable conditions for the local property
development industry
The first development projects in each of the new zones triggered other
development projects. The process of urban development was brought
about firstly by the residential sector. New neighbourhoods were built on
farmland in the new urban zones around the city. The buildings, which are
between six and ten storeys high, or more than 30 storeys high, in areas of
relatively high density (small public spaces, not much greenery), were built
for the emerging middle class. (47) Six companies became the go-to urban
development companies and divided the market between themselves by
geographical area (see Table 1; Map 1). The two state-owned property com-
panies, Dongsheng and Qilin, the two property branches of corporate groups
Feilong and Xiongye, and the two private property companies, Ansha and
Shengshi Jinhua, were the principal beneficiaries of the local property de-
velopment market and were able to reinforce their positions thanks to or-
ders from the state. These companies built new residential zones principally
for the employees of state-owned industrial businesses, schools, and hos-
pitals, as well as various local government offices. (48)
More generally, during the second half of the 2000s, the net rate of profit
for businesses was on average more than 30%, and the property industry
enjoyed favourable conditions. Firstly, some companies that had favourable
relationships with the local administration (in particular with the land bu-
reau: tudi ju 土地局) were able to defer, after the completion of projects,
the payments for the land, which is the principal cost for developers in China
(30%-50% of project costs). However, according to the Property Law of
2002, which was reinforced in 2010, half the total cost of the land must be
paid back within the month, and the full amount within the year. Secondly,
the whole of the property sector benefited from a “given” demand for prop-
erty, which was rapidly motivated by the urban household financial invest-
ment rationale because of the increase in property prices (see Table 2). The
majority of middle class households in Qujing do indeed own one or more
apartments aside from their place of residence (we will touch on this again
at the end of the article).
Using large property projects to stimulate urban
development
Since the enormous increase in urban surface area and construction of
new residential neighbourhoods, the urban model has become multicentral.
The strategy for property development-inspired growth relied, at a sec-
ondary stage, on the establishment of big property development projects
that are considered leverage for increasing land and property values. 
Firstly, in order to increase the value of peripheral residential land, the Qu-
jing government relied, from the start, on external developers to build high-
end neighbourhoods. Private companies Guanfang and Yangguang were the
forerunners when they built the first two villa areas in Qujing on farmland
that at the time was on the southwest outskirts of the urban perimeter, and
partly occupied by villages. The target clientele belong to a higher socio-
professional category than anyone living in the prefecture of Qujing (6.2
million people over 28,904 km2) or in other cities in Yunnan, notably Kun-
ming, and the neighbouring provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou. (49) The de-
velopment of these two areas started in 2005 and continued until 2012,
after the overall area for development was expanded. They inspired three
local developers: Dongsheng built a neighbourhood of villas in the urban
zone to the north; Shengshi did the same in the western area, and Minda in
the southern area. Minda, which built a luxury environment on land bought
in 2009 and originally located relatively far from the city centre (3km), ben-
efited from its complementarity with other luxury environments that were
being built by two national-level developers, Evergrande (Hengda 恒大) and
Country Garden (Biguiyuan 碧桂园). (50) Minda was able to ensure higher
N o . 2 0 1 7 / 1  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 63
47. The urban middle class refers to the socio-professional groups whose net annual disposable in-
come at least matches the local average, i.e., 25,810 yuan (2013). By extension, these are the
socio-professional groups who are financially secure enough to have access to banking credit:
employees on a salary or independent professionals.
48. Most of those employed by the state received an official apartment that was either free or had
negligible rent, close to the city centre.
49. Buyers were made up of directors, managers, and supervisors from big industrial companies, often
state-owned in the tobacco, chemical, food processing, commercial vehicle, electrical energy, and
coal industries. Financially successful independent businessmen/women as well as high-ranking
civil servants were also buyers.
50. Evergrande and Country Garden’s economic model is to develop high-end residential areas on the
outskirts of second and fourth-tier cities, where land prices are lower.
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prices for its villas (12,000 RMB/m2) because they were set within a better
environmental framework, including facilities for residents (schools, sports
centre) when compared with Evergrande’s villas, the price of which was al-
ready double the average local house price (8-10,000 RMB/m2). Following
the rapid sale of its 150 villas at the end of 2010, Minda built two new villa
neighbourhoods on land that had increased to 500 hectares by the end of
the project. This extension was relatively risk-free, because the orders were
already guaranteed, with three quarters of the 300 villas paid for in advance
(between 16,000 and 20,000RMB/m2). Minda’s success confirmed the re-
gion’s potential, and Country Garden quickly built the first phase of its res-
idential construction project. Ninety percent of the 120 villas and 330
apartments had been sold by summer 2014 on land bought in the summer
of 2013.
At the same time, with the aim of structuring the new urban zones around
their central areas, the City of Qujing began several construction project
models, which can be seen as  “templates” (zhao shang ying zi 招商引资)
for economic growth by triggering other real estate projects. These took the
form of multifunctional urban centres; shopping complexes were built
around tower blocks containing offices, hotels, and apartments. As men-
tioned earlier, the urban centres created by local developers such as Qilin
(a local state-owned company) and Feilong (the property development
branch of a corporate group of the same name) for the southern and eastern
zones, as well as the urban centres created by private external developers
such as Xianzhong Cheng (Wenzhou) and Wanda (Beijing) for the northern
and western zones, introduced commercial and leisure services that had
previously been lacking (see Map 1). The central urban space was also af-
fected by a desire to modernise the City of Qujing by providing consumer
zones for a market of one million inhabitants. Two symbolic urban projects
have been developed by two local private companies. Xiongye’s project has
been developed within a compact space of 2.6 hectares and Ansha’s project
covers 8.6 hectares, the size of a whole neighbourhood. They both combine
the highest tower blocks in the city (218m and 180m respectively) with of-
fices, hotels, and apartments, and provide the city centre with the largest
commercial and leisure complexes (>100,000m2).
Large urban projects and construction of communal
buildings
Large construction projects have huge effects on the whole chain of the
local development industry (construction, fixtures and fittings, advisory,
etc.). This is particularly true of multifunctional development projects. From
an economic and fiscal point of view, they create jobs within the commer-
cial sector and increase the city’s share of fiscal revenue (tax on businesses
and corporate revenue tax). For these priority construction projects, support
from the City of Qujing, using land as leverage, must be pointed out. As far
as state projects of local importance are concerned (this is the case for Qilin
and Xianzhong Cheng and their Qilin Jiacheng and Wenzhou Guoji construc-
tion projects) and those of province-wide importance (this is the case for
Feilong and its Jiangjun Zhen project), land was made either freely available
or very inexpensive. In the case of private construction projects (Ansha,
Xiongye, and Wanda), the price of the land was negotiated between each
developer and the City of Qujing, meaning that sales were made without
going through the official auctioning procedure, even though the 2002 law
concerning the sale of land prohibits this. (51) In addition to this, certain con-
struction projects were based on conditions negotiated on the basis of
“compensatory” public-private partnerships for the construction of certain
communal buildings, notably schools. (52) These partnerships, which are fre-
quently used tools in China, (53) are based on compensation in kind, princi-
pally land ownership as an equivalent exchange (deng jia jiao huan 等价交
换), or on exploitation rights (jing ying quan 经营权). The first type of mech-
anism was used with Ansha. As part of an agreement with the City of Qu-
jing, (54) property development company Ansha financed the work on a new
school of agriculture in the northern urban zone. As compensation, the City
of Qujing promised a lower price for land located in the city centre that
Ansha wanted for its ongoing multifunctional urban development project.
The second type of mechanism was used during Minda’s first luxury villa
development project. This project went ahead based on the condition that
Minda also built and operated the first golf course and the first tennis com-
plex in Qujing. 
Urban development and the vital supply of capital 
The financial system, that is to say mainly the state-owned banks and to
a lesser extent local financial establishments, played an essential role in
supplying the property development industry with capital, therefore bring-
ing about urban growth based on property development. Throughout the
2000s, the property industry benefited from a favourable financial situation.
Property production was based on a finance model that relied on advanced
payments from future property owners and required a minimum of the
company’s own funds. At the same time, property development created a
large investment opportunity for banks and local financial establishments.
At a financial level, and in accordance with the presale system that is ac-
cepted throughout the country, local businesses were able to source the
necessary funds for the construction of residential buildings as soon as they
acquired the land. It was only from the beginning of 2010 that amended
legislation required that houses could only be sold after two-thirds of the
construction process had been completed. (55) Mortgage loans to households
were a major result of the increase in demand for property and represented
a substantial share of bank loans from the second half of the 2000s. (56)
Mortgage loans supplemented the buyers’ “traditional” method of paying
in cash using money from personal savings, family loans, or a third party. (57)
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51. According to the Land Law, the sale price of land-use rights is determined by marketisation mech-
anisms based on a bidding process. Yet despite this law being reinforced in 2004 and in 2010, it
is often bypassed through a variety of methods. For more information see: Wei Yigang, Patrick
Tsun-Ip Lam, Chiang Yat-Hung, Barbara Yuk-Ping Leung, and William Seabrooke, “An exploratory
analysis of impediments to China’s credit control on the real estate industry: An institutional per-
spective,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 23, No. 85, 2014, pp. 44–67.
52. Building schools at the developer’s cost is becoming more and more the economic model for
some developers, indicated by the presence of private kindergartens for local residents. But the
attraction of a development project can be reinforced by the presence of more than just a little
school. As part of the second phase of its villa project, Country Garden is very proud to have com-
pletely financed the construction of a renowned public school in Yunnan (132 classes going from
nursery school right up to Year 13, or sixth form), Yun shi da fu zhong, which is affiliated with
Yunnan Normal University and which will be located on a neighbouring plot. Access to this school
is a powerful sales tool for the Country Garden development project.
53. On this subject, see Wang De, Zhang Li, Zhao Zhang, and Simon X. Zhao, “Urban infrastructure fi-
nancing in reform-era China,” Urban Studies, Vol. 48, No. 14, 2011, pp. 2975-2998.
54. It has been specified that this was a completely oral contract.
55. Barbara Y. P. Leung and Athenda S. C. Ma, “Exploration of the presale property market in China
from an institutional perspective,” International Journal of Strategic Property Management, Vol.
17, No. 3, 2013, pp. 248-262.
56. Neil Gibson, “The privatization of urban housing in China and its contribution to financial system
development,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 18, No. 58, 2009, pp. 175-184.
57. Si-Ming Li and Zheng Yi, “Financing Home Purchase in China, with Special Reference to
Guangzhou,” Housing Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2007, pp. 409-425.
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The first mortgage loans were accessed in Qujing in 2002. (58) They were
generally obtained from the same banks that were offering developers prop-
erty construction loans. The size of initial transfers is lower during periods
of monetary policy that favour property investment. The rate has been at
20% since the beginning of 2016, where previously it was at 30%. By and
large, mortgage loans were broadly granted in China because the risk as-
sessment system was based in part on the converging interests of the banks,
property development companies, and urban governments. (59) In Qujing,
the conditions are that you have a local residence permit (hukou 户口) and
proof of financial security, such as stable employment or personal assets
(house, car).
Property investments were also promoted by the lax application of legis-
lation, which allowed developers to keep their funds to a minimum when
buying land-use rights for their construction projects. According to 2003
banking legislation, loans for property construction can only be granted in
China following the release of certificates supporting land-use rights, plan-
ning, and construction. (60) As a result, land purchase is financed using funds
from the property development company itself. However, putting this leg-
islation into action took time, and the restrictions in terms of bank loans
for land acquisition were reinforced in 2008. (61) In Qujing, alongside defer-
ring payments for land concessions (see above), using other land as collat-
eral was also a well-known practice. The main local developers were at a
particular advantage because they were the prioritised clients of the
branches of three of the four big state-owned banks specialised in the con-
struction and development of the country (Bank of China, Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, Chinese Construction Bank). For Dongsheng and
Qilin, the two municipal construction businesses, which could obtain loans
that represented up to 70% of the investment, the loan conditions estab-
lished based on the guiding interest rate fixed by the Central Bank were par-
ticularly advantageous, as well as for large multifunctional urban
construction projects that represented very large investments (>1 billion
RMB: Map 1). On the basis of renewed agreements over local five-year plans
(2006-2010, 2011-2015) between the City of Qujing and big banks, the big
urban development projects helped create diversification for bank invest-
ments. These construction projects did indeed contribute to the increase in
bank investments in the commercial property sector, in accordance with
the 2010 newly restrictive banking regulations for property development
projects that were purely residential.
Real estate has created a source of investment for other qualified “shadow
banking” financial circuits. (62) Firstly, it has attracted a lot of industry capital.
Feilong and Xiongye, both branches of larger corporate groups, were able
to finance their construction projects with money belonging to the group,
a percentage of which was in the form of industrial bank loans. The financing
could be done indirectly because the developers also forged partnerships
with industry-related businesses. It is just as commonplace for these com-
panies to borrow from banks and finance developers who don’t have the
necessary funds to buy land or receive loans (30% of their own funds). Prop-
erty developers Ansha and Shengshi Jinhua had access to this type of indi-
rect loan, which is often used in China. (63) They financed their first residential
property development projects using external funds through partnerships
with corporate businesses. Secondly, local property development businesses
that don’t have access to banking credit due to their small size, lack of sup-
port from the urban government, or lack of financial security can appeal to
these various companies for microloans based on an elevated borrowing
rate (>12%-15%). Some of these businesses can also guarantee loans to
the developers via a 2-3% commission. The property developers Dongsheng
and Ansha each have their own loan company and have also acted as banks
or guarantors for other developers.
The proliferation of property development projects
and the slowing of demand
The availability of capital made it possible to create the city and boost
business for the property development industry and the fiscal revenue of
the Qujing local government, as well as represents investment opportunities
for the local financial system. However, urban production cannot continue
indefinitely without taking into account the principal variable: demand. In
China, like everywhere else, property demand is based on the land-use value
or profit value, (64) since a household might buy a property asset to live in
or as a financial investment. At the moment, in China, it is quite common
for people to own several apartments. Even if this financial rationale is dif-
ficult to measure given the lack of relevant statistics, whether that be for
the number of buildings that are lived in (once they have been sold) or in-
dividual asset wealth, (65) it has indisputably played a role in urban growth
over the last 15 years. (66)
Since 2010, construction projects in Qujing have multiplied. The con-
struction of luxury neighbourhoods in the south of the city (Minda and
Country Garden) has encouraged investment from other developers, both
local and external. No less than ten neighbourhoods have been built or
are under construction in the southern part of the city. Multifunctional
projects have also set a precedent as indicated by the fact that there are
three other construction projects underway from the main developers
(Dongsheng Plaza, Shengshi Jinhua International Plaza, and Ansha’s “15
towns” [Table 1]). However, over the same period, the proportion of units
for sale (residences and shops) has been very high, between 77% and 69%
in 2011 and 2012 (see Table 2), and given the number of developers, de-
mand seems to be lacking. Promotional offers from developers are now
commonplace for residential development projects. (67) The growing num-
ber of commercial projects also poses a problem for the same reasons.
Following the example of large national developers (Wanda is the em-
blematic example in China), commercial real estate entails a new eco-
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58. “Qujing di chan: liang sui le,” Qujing Real Estate Magazine, No. 11, September 2012.
59. Yigang Wei, Patrick Lam, Chiang Tsun-Ip, Yat-Hung Leung, Barbara Yuk-Ping, and William Seabrooke,
“An exploratory analysis of impediments to China’s credit control on the real estate industry: An
institutional perspective,” op. cit.
60. Min Liu, Financing alternatives for small real estate developers in China: A case study of
Guangzhou, op. cit.
61. Ibid.
62. Sara Hsu and Jianjun Li, “The rise and fall of shadow banking in China,” op. cit.
63. The indirect bank loans that are mentioned here refer explicitly to the Chinese “trust industry”
(Hsu and Li, ibid.).
64. On this subject, see Thierry Theurillat, Patrick Rérat, and Olivier Crevoisier, “The real estate markets:
Players, institutions and territories,” Urban Studies, Vol. 52, No. 8, 2015, pp. 1414-1433.
65. Property ownership, whether for personal use or for investment purposes, represents the largest
share of wealth in Chinese households. For more information, see Li-Gang Liu, “Is China’s property
market heading toward collapse?”, Policy Brief, Peterson Institute for International Economics,
August 2014, pp. 14-21. One can also highlight the fact that the lack of tax on property is an im-
portant factor that encourages people to invest in property. For clarity’s sake, it should be noted
that there are taxes associated with real estate, but these are focused on real estate transactions,
including pilot projects established in Chongqing and Shanghai.
66. Fulong Wu, “Commodification and housing market cycles in Chinese cities,” op. cit. See argument
development at the end of the first section of the article.
67. Gifts in kind may be made (example: a percentage of the surface area of residences will be free;
a ton of petrol, etc.) or in cash (example: vouchers valued at 50% more during the first official
day of sales).
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nomic model for local developers who until now have only specialised in
the residential sector. They are financial products for the owners, in this
case the developers and individuals who count on financial output from
the rent paid by those using the commercial premises. Indeed, large com-
mercial premises used by large commercial groups such as Wal-Mart or
Carrefour (a French supermarket chain), which function as the economic
driving force for urban projects, stay in the possession of the developers.
Small parts of commercial premises are generally sold to households as a
property investment. This model is commonplace in China; the owners of
shop premises are not generally the ones who are actually using it. How-
ever, although Qilin’s (Qilin Jiacheng) and Xianzhong Cheng’s (Wenzhou
Guoji) commercial development projects seem to be a success in terms
of both exploitation and also sale of commercial property to private in-
dividuals, (68) there are three other projects that are in difficulty. In the
town centre, construction work on the tallest tower has been suspended
since the summer of 2015 (Xiongye Jindu Guoji), and negotiations with
the main commercial operator, superstore Gingko (Kunming), which had
been considered a sure thing, have not reached a conclusion. Also in the
city centre, construction work on a second shopping centre (Wanhe Guoji)
has also been delayed, even though operator contracts were signed in De-
cember 2015 with KFC and GOME (electronics). For the flagship tourist
construction project in the western urban zone, Feilong has had difficulty
finding operators for the commercial and leisure areas (boutiques, restau-
rants, karaoke) that form the palace, even though construction work was
completed in 2014.
Conclusion
How has urban growth based on land in China been financed? By devel-
oping a theoretical framework, this article concentrates firstly on the inter-
relationship between land, urban infrastructure, development projects, and
the financial system. Although the dominating field of geographical urban
literature concentrates on land as the central financial tool at the heart of
urban development thanks to revenue from the sale of land plots to prop-
erty development companies, other researchers show the importance of in-
vestment in infrastructure through a debt-based monetary system. But even
if land sales open up the property market, the accumulation of capital can
only be understood if one takes into account what happens later on. The fi-
nancial system plays a central role. From the very beginning, land debt en-
ables the financing of “communal and public” needs, especially basic urban
infrastructure. This is the condition for development projects that respond
to more “private and individual” needs. The dynamics of urban growth rely
therefore on a level of demand that in part also corresponds to an invest-
ment rationale and which assumes financing from the real estate industry. 
Next, the case study sheds light on the way in which urban growth, via
property development based on the continuous increase in land and prop-
erty prices, was organised in the case of a medium-sized city in Yunnan. 
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68. Property developer Qilin is the owner of 60% of the commercial surfaces and has sold 40% to
investors (households and businesses); property developer Xian Zhong Cheng is the owner of 30%
of the commercial surfaces and by the end of 2014 had sold half of the remaining 70% to in-
vestors.
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Table 2 – Qujing property market data
District of Qujing Qilin: 1442 km2 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2020*
Population 626,535 651,315 665,720 689,012 740,747 705,062 713,357 758,000 1,000,000
GDP (billion RMB) 8.89 11.34 17.25 24.47 31.5 37.01 42.9 49.43
Primary sector in percent 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 4
Secondary sector in percent 60 57 63 63 62 62 63 62
Tertiary sector in percent 33 37 33 32 34 33 33 34
Investment in fixed capital (billion RMB) 1.67 3.78 6.37 11.04 19.28 24.11 23.14 29.85
Investment in real estate 
development projects (billion RMB)
0.72 1.31 no data no data 5.61 no data 7.35 7.31
Real estate proportion in percent 43 35 29 32 24
Area urbanised for city centre use (in km2) 24.5 27.5 32.2 37 56 61 66 67.9 100
Qujing city centre 
Residential sector average price per m2
2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Whole city 1,500 2,200 2,850 3,200 3,640 3,814 4,088
Central urban zone no data no data no data no data 4,062 4,800 6,100
Northern urban zone no data no data no data no data 2,878 3,200 3,250
Southern urban zone no data no data no data no data 3,449 3,470 3,390
Western urban zone no data no data no data no data 4,181 3,800 3,800
Eastern urban zone no data no data no data no data 3,633 3,800 3,900
Source: 2011-2013 annual reports from property consultancy Lisking in Qujing.
* Projection
It highlights the multiple interdependencies and agreements concerning
land access (in terms of price and property tax) and the methods used to
finance development projects (obtaining credit and financing from buyers)
between local government, property developers, and local banking and fi-
nancial institutions. In order to establish the urban development plan, the
aim of which is to double the number of inhabitants between now and
2020 so as to reach one million, the Qujing local government has relied
on a small number of developers. The strategy has consisted of building
new urban peripheral zones. With regards to this, the two municipal prop-
erty developers were granted land to build the new northern and southern
urban zones. The strategy has also consisted of creating alliances with both
local and external developers, who are used as urban growth “magnets.”
Urban centres in the form of large multifunctional development projects
for the new outlying urban zones and for the city centre, as well as for
high-end residential areas, were built. Urban development has gone hand-
in-hand with large investments in infrastructure. Some of these invest-
ments (site preparation, schools, sports complexes, and/or cultural
establishments) have been financed by investment companies created by
the Qujing government or by property developers as part of contracts and
compensatory negotiations with the city. Qujing’s urban production has
above all been made possible by capital supplied by the local financial sys-
tem, in particular by branches of the large state-owned banks, via a busi-
ness model that enables the sale of residences at the very first stages of a
development project, and agreements that limit the need for funds when
acquiring land (land concessions).
In addition, in both theoretical and empirical terms, two subjects for re-
flection should be highlighted in order to understand the role of the financial
system in the Chinese land and real estate-led growth model in a new light.
Firstly, one must take into account the various negotiations and agreements
that already exist on varying scales (local, regional, and national) between
the urban growth system operators, that is to say the government, property
developers, and financial institutions. This means, on the one hand, that one
has to think beyond the financial mechanism based on fiscal revenue com-
ing from the sale of land-use rights as the source of the urban growth model
within the framework of decentralised governance. On the other hand, it
means going beyond the dominant macro-economic approaches to the
analysis of property markets and monetary policies in China. Secondly, it’s
about taking financial rationale into account in order to understand growth
in Chinese cities. Although property as a financial product is an essential el-
ement within the property cycles of the last 15 years, there are paradoxi-
cally very few studies on the actual modalities of the “transformation of
real estate to financial asset” (69) as an investment prospect for surplus cap-
ital in China.
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